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Abstract 
This paper examines the concept of corporate liability in the 
context of occupational health and safety in New Zealand. In 
particular it looks at the new duty of officers proposed in the 
Health and Safety Reform Bill 2014. New Zealand’s 
occupational health and safety framework has experienced a 
regulatory breakdown, stemming from its incomplete 
implementation of the Robens Model for health and safety 
regulation. That breakdown involves many flaws and gaps, 
especially as far as corporate liability is concerned, while the 
modern world of work has created new challenges to health and 
safety regulation. This setting demands a new regulatory tool to 
create effective corporate liability and increase the compliance 
of companies’. This article examines the new world of work and 
the inherent clash between OHS regulation and the corporate 
world to reveal two main conclusions; the major barrier to 
company compliance is a lack of effective inducement; and there 
is a desperate need to create health and safety leaders within 
companies, in order to create a positive health and safety 
culture. These two conclusions promote the main proposition of 
this paper, that the proposed duty of officers will be 
instrumental in improving the state of workplace health and 
safety. This paper examines the duty, as drafted, to emphasise its 
potential and to highlight certain flaws which may limit that 
potential.  
 
 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding cover pages, table of contents, 
footnotes and bibliography) comprises approximately 12, 083 
words. 
 
Subjects and Topics 
 
Occupational Health and Safety – Corporate Liability – 
Officer Duty -  
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I Introduction 
At 3:45 pm on 19 November 19 2010 a disastrous methane 
explosion ripped through the Pike River underground mine in 
the West Coast region of New Zealand. The tragedy resulted in 
the death of 29 workers and is the country’s most devastating 
workplace accident in almost a century.1 The Pike River disaster 
received extensive media coverage,2 which served to increase 
public attention, spurring widespread public outcry. The disaster 
awakened the people of New Zealand to the shameful state of 
their nation’s workplace health and safety regulation. In this 
way, it acted as a catalyst to the reform of New Zealand’s 
workplace health and safety framework.3  
 
In the wake of the Pike River tragedy the New Zealand 
government established two bodies to assess the state of 
occupational health and safety (OHS). The government first 
established the Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine 
Tragedy, just days after the explosion.4 The Commission had a 
broad mandate to discover what happened at Pike River, why, 
and identify how to avoid it happening again.5 A year and a half 
                                                
1 (06 November 2012) 685 NZPD 6273. 
2  See generally, “Latest on the Pike River coal mine disaster” Stuff 
<http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/pike-river-mine-disaster>, see also; “Mine 
explosion gets worldwide coverage” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, 19 
November 2010, at  
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10688829
>). 
3  Simon Bridges “Speech to EMA Occupational Health and Safety 
Conference” (Auckland, 17 April 2013); See generally, Kate Chapman and 
Deidre Mussen “Pike River report: Learn from tragedy – Minister” Stuff 
(online ed, 11 April 2013, at < 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/8536948/Pike-River-report-Learn-
from-tragedy-Minister>) on how the experience of the tragedy demands we 
learn and change, the approach of the government was to emphasise the 
opportunity to learn, in this way the tragedy acted as a catalyst for change. 
See also, Deidre Mussen “Training facility in memory of Pike River” Stuff 
(online ed, 03 November 2013, at 
<http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/9357520/Training-facility-in-memory-of-
Pike-River>). 
4 “Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy” (16 December 
2010) 173 New Zealand Gazette 4261, (hereinafter, the Royal Commission). 
5 “About the Pike River Royal Commission” (29 November 2010) Pike River 
Royal Commission <http://pikeriver.royalcommission.govt.nz/About-the-
Commission>. And see “Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine 
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later on 16 April 2012 the Cabinet agreed to the establishment of 
the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety.6 
The Taskforce’s terms of reference were broader still, requiring 
that it; identify whether the health and safety system as a whole 
is fit for purpose, and recommend a package of measures that 
will result in a 25 per cent reduction in the rate of fatalities and 
serious injuries by 2020.7  
 
Each inquiry identified a multitude of flaws in New 
Zealand’s health and safety framework,8 and that those failings 
have resulted in widespread noncompliance. Each body urged 
for immediate and drastic action.  
 
The Government responded with a proposal for extensive 
reform, the biggest reform of health and safety regulation in 
over twenty years, in the form of the Health and Safety Reform 
Bill 2014.9 The proposed Health and Safety in Reform Bill (the 
Bill) is explicitly based on the Model Work Health and Safety 
Act 2011 (the Model Act) promulgated in Australia only a few 
years earlier, 10  allowing New Zealand to capitalise on the 
extensive research and planning that went in to the Australian 
reform.11  
                                                                                                     
Tragedy” (16 December 2010) 173 New Zealand Gazette 4261, for detailed 
Terms of Reference. 
6  Cabinet Minutes “Terms of Reference for the Independent Taskforce 
undertaking the Strategic review of the Workplace Health and Safety 
System” (16 April 2012) CAB Min (12) 12/14, (hereinafter the Taskforce). 
7 Cabinet Minutes, above note 6, at [2] and [4]. 
8 The Report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety: 
Main Report (Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, April 2013), 
at [20]. 
9 Health and Safety Reform Bill (2014) (192-1) (hereinafter the Bill). The 
Bill was introduced into Parliament at the time of writing this paper, in 
March 2014, and the Select Committee is not due to report until September 
13th 2014 (well after the completion of this paper). Thus, the paper cannot 
comment on any suggestions or alteration made during the Select Committee 
process or from any debates at the various readings. The Bill is not set to be 
passed until 2015. 
10 Model Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Aus), (hereinafter the Model 
Act). 
11  See Generally; Susy Frankel and John Yeabsley “Features of the 
Uniqueness of New Zealand and their Role in Regulation” Regulatory 
Reform Toolkit  
<http://www.regulatorytoolkit.ac.nz/resources/papers/book-3/chapter-1-
features-of-the-uniqueness-of-new-zealand-and-their-role-in-regulation> 
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The reform heeds the warnings of each inquiry, and 
proposes various tools to address them. To analyse the Bill in its 
entirety is far beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, this 
paper’s focus is the issue of corporate liability, and in particular, 
one aspect of the reform central to that issue, the regulation of 
senior managers, directors and high-ranking officers. The Bill 
includes a new ‘duty of officers’, 12 which for the first time, will 
demand that decision makers within firms actively participate in 
health and safety matters. Section 39 places a personal duty on 
officers to exercise due diligence to ensure the primary duty 
holders within their firms comply with their duties. 
 
Reform, even extensive reform, does not guarantee 
positive transformation, or even positive change. This paper 
concentrates on the personal duty placed officers because, as a 
singular piece of the reform, it stands out as useful, effective and 
potentially pivotal in the effort to secure safe workplaces for 
new Zealanders. 
For too long, workplace health and safety duties have been 
framed in entity centric language and those with decision 
making, culture setting and leadership powers have bore almost 
none of the legal burden of protecting workers. This paper aims 
to cast a light on the importance of the role of senior managers. 
As Lord Cullen observed in the inquiry into the loss of the Piper 
Alpha oil platform that resulted in 167 fatalities:13   
 
No amount of detailed regulations for safety 
improvements could make up for deficiencies in the 
way that safety is managed by operators.  
 
There are several important external elements in play that 
highlight the need for and importance of the officer duty. The 
first element is the general regulatory breakdown that has 
occurred in New Zealand, highlighted by both the Taskforce and 
Royal Commission. Secondly, the new world of work acts as a 
                                                
12 Health and Safety Reform Bill, at s 49. 
13  Cullen WD The public inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster. London 
HMSO, at [301], (emphasis added). As cited in; R Flin and S Yule 
“Leadership for safety: industrial experience” (2004) 13 Qual Saf Health 
Care ii45 at [ii45].  
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double-edged sword that makes old regulatory measures 
particularly unsuitable, and simultaneously brings new 
challenges for regulators.  
 
Two features are frequently cited as fundamental to the 
success of OHS regulation, one feature being leadership, another 
being effective inducement in a commercial setting. The 
personal due diligence duty placed on officers will go lengths to 
addressing both. By targeting those in control, the duty will 
create occupational health and safety leaders in every enterprise 
in one clean stroke, while the personal nature of the duty, 
combined with increased penalties, should provide the 
incentives for compliance the current framework is desperately 
lacking. The officers’ duty is a personal duty requiring pro-
activity in health and safety. The public expects high-ranking 
officers to be active in protecting those below them and to take 
responsibility for their role and control, and the officer duty is 
the first legislative move towards delivering on that expectation. 
 
The new due diligence duty has great potential, and could 
effect great positive change in New Zealand’s health and safety 
framework. This paper explains that potential, with the aim that 
once its importance is clear, the duty itself will not be permitted 
to be encumbered by avoidable flaws or ambiguities. 
 
Part II of this paper will discuss certain aspects of OHS 
regulation theory and the regulatory breakdown that has 
occurred in New Zealand that inform a discussion of the 
proposed officer duty. Part III will outline the relationship 
between OHS and the commercial world, to highlight the barriers 
regulators face in ensuring corporate compliance. Part IV turns 
to the new world of work and emphasises those features that 
increase the need for the new officer duty. Part V will discuss 
the ability of the new duty to create effective inducement for 
corporate compliance, and part VI will examine how the duty 
creates health and safety leaders, who are well positioned to 
create a positive health and safety culture. Finally, part VII 
examines the duty, as drafted, to emphasise its potential and to 
highlight certain flaws which risk limiting that potential. 
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II Regulatory Breakdown 
 
Workplace health and safety is an area that unquestionably 
requires governmental regulatory intervention. Experience has 
shown that when enforcement wanes the market alone does not 
deliver safe workplaces. 14  When left to their own devices, 
industry players such as companies will often not ensure the 
health and safety of their workers. Rather, it is up to the 
regulators to demand and facilitate worker protection. Hence, 
given that it is human health and safety at stake, it is imperative 
that the regulation is fit for purpose and effective. Unfortunately, 
this has not been the case in New Zealand’s recent history. 
 
A Workplace Health and Safety Regulation – Setting the 
Scene  
 
Occupational health and safety is a challenging and paradoxical 
area to regulate. 15  OHS policy makers are faced with the 
challenge of finding a balance between many interests – as 
enterprises and business owners desire minimal governmental 
intrusion while the labour force demands better protection. 
Adding to the complexity is the inherent imbalance in OHS that 
the risk (of noncompliance) is borne by the workers, while the 
cost (of compliance) is borne by the employer, or enterprise. 
Successful workplace health and safety regulation requires 
balance. An effective regulatory approach will strike 
equilibrium between the various interested parties to ensure 
industry buy-in while always protecting the weaker party, the 
workers. Over the years, New Zealand has failed to achieve that 
balance.  
 
                                                
14  Orly Lobel “Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: the 
Governance of Workplace Safety” (2005) 57 Administrative Law Review 
1071, (hereinafter Lobel, Interlocking), at [1097]. See also, The Report of the 
Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety: Main Report, above 
note 8, on New Zealand’s regulatory breakdown and resulting levels of 
compliance, revealing that the private sector does not self-organise. 
15 Lobel, Interlocking, above note 14 at [1077]. 
10 
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B Regulatory Breakdown – A History 
 
New Zealand’s workplace health and safety is currently 
suffering a widespread regulatory breakdown, the methods 
adopted are proving ineffectual and the systems in place are 
failing to perform. The following section will explain how OHS 
regulation has evolved and changed over the years in New 
Zealand, and ultimately where it stands today. Understanding 
both the current state of regulation, and the decisions and 
underlying theories and ideologies that lead to that state, is 
essential to any analysis of reform proposals and their ability to 
perform.  
 
1 “New” governance 
Currently, the leading approach to health and safety regulation 
in most developed economies is ‘new governance’. New 
governance is a response to the flaws of command and control 
regulation, or, old governance. The theory itself has been built 
from the shared experiences of practitioners and scholars across 
a wide variety of diverse policy domains.16 While the concept is 
far from settled there are several fundamental features that have 
been grouped to form the core of the distinct theory of 
governance. Those features include voluntary performance 
standards, and less rigid less prescriptive regulation, that is less 
committed to uniform processes and outcomes.  
 
New governance style regulation is dedicated to the 
achievement of results that are broadly in line with the overall 
goal of a policy. A new governance approach “[aims to] steer 
corporate governance or management systems in socially 
desirable directions – other than by simply commanding them to 
behave in a prescribed way.”17 That approach capitalises on the 
experience and expertise of those being regulated, by enlisting 
them to develop the most efficient and effective ways of 
                                                
16 Gráinne De Búrca and Joanna Scott :Introduction: New Governance, Law 
and Constitutionalism” in Gráinne De Búrca and Joanna Scott (eds) Law and 
New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publisher, Portland, OR, 2006) 
1-14, at [3]. 
17 Tucker Old Lessons for New Governance, above note 20 at [15]. 
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achieving a set policy outcome, rather than the traditional 
approach of enforcing strict top-down rules across the board.  
 
When it comes to workplace health and safety regulation, 
new governance is not so aptly described as new. New 
governance regulation was first introduced to OHS by the report 
of the Robens Committee on health and safety in 1972, 
commonly called the Robens Report.18 Its mission was to review 
the health and safety system in the United Kingdom and 
consider what changes were needed. The Report recommended a 
major reform including, a shift from prescriptive to flexible 
performance-based or ‘goal-setting’ standards, a complete 
overhaul to simplify and consolidate health and safety 
legislation, and a resolute move to a self-regulating system 
involving strong active involvement by both employers and 
workers.  
The Robens Report introduced the world of health and 
safety to new governance style regulation, and its formula 
spread to most developed economies across the world. New 
Zealand was one of the last countries to make the regulatory 
change in 1992. 
 
2 Old governance in New Zealand – pre Robens  
Prior to 1992, New Zealand had an old governance or, 
‘traditional’, model of health and safety regulation. Until the 
1980s the New Zealand approach to health and safety was a 
rather disorganised ‘plethora’ of dogmatic, sector-specific Acts 
that were too complex to facilitate compliance. 19  The OHS 
                                                
18  Alfred Robens Safety and Health at Work, Report of the Committee 
(HMSO, Cmnd 5034, 1972) 
19  These included the Petroleum Act 1937, Bush Workers Act 1945, 
Geothermal Energy Act 1953, Health Act 1956, Construction Act 1959, 
Shearers Act 1962, Mining Act 1971, Agricultural Workers Act 1977 and the 
Coal Mines Act 1979. Other pieces of legislation passed in the 1980s were 
the Factories and Commercial Premises Act 1981, the Quarries and 
Tunnels Act 1982 and the Transport Service Licensing  Act 1989, as 
listed in National Occupational Health and Safety Advisory Committee 
Occupational Health and Safety in New Zealand: NOHSAC: Technical 
Report 7 (Allen and Clarke, Wellington, 2006), at [12]. 
12 
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legislative framework relied on highly prescriptive solutions,20 
and was “underpinned by a paternalistic policy of government 
intervention, where the government was considered to be 
responsible for ensuring the achievement of good occupational 
health and safety outcomes.”21 In many ways, the OHS system at 
that time exemplified many of the flaws and weaknesses that 
had plagued the United Kingdom pre-Robens Report.  
 
As can be expected, that traditional style of governance 
failed, just as it had in other jurisdictions. Due to the narrow 
prescriptive nature of the regulations much of it had become 
unfit for purpose, and its inflexibility meant it would never 
adapt. The world of work is simply too diverse for strict 
command and control regulation that can easily become out-
dated. Governments lack the resources to inspect and enforce a 
mass of detailed Acts, and businesses struggle with the 
complexity – negatively impacting on their understanding and 
compliance.  
 
3 Robens in New Zealand 
The Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 was introduced 
as New Zealand’s first single catch-all health and safety act.22 
The 1992 Act introduced the performance based standards of the 
Robens Model, requiring that duty holders “take all practicable 
steps to ensure the safety of employees,”23 offering a new level 
of flexibility to duty-holders for meeting their obligations.  
 
Unfortunately, New Zealand failed to properly implement 
a Robens model, and that failure has caused lasting problems.24 
The Royal Commission on the Pike River Mine tragedy found 
that to this day, New Zealand’s implementation of the Robens 
approach has been incomplete, particularly in relation to the 
                                                
20  National Occupational Health and Safety Advisory Committee 
Occupational Health and Safety in New Zealand: NOHSAC: Technical 
Report 7, above note 19, at [12]. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 (NZ). 
23 Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, s 6. 
24 The Report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety: 
Executive Report (Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, April 
2013) at [11]. 
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relative lack of regulations, approved codes of practice or 
guidance necessary to make the broad natured Act as effective 
as intended.25 When New Zealand introduced a Robens model it 
failed to achieve balance. Regrettably, it removed prescription 
where prescription was warranted,26 and an overly prescriptive, 
complex regime was replaced with one that overcompensated, 
resulting in insufficient guidance and legal bite.  
 
New Governance and the Robens model, as implemented 
in New Zealand, have not been sufficiently effective and have 
not protected workers to the degree desired or required. The 
political and cultural environment at the time of New Zealand’s 
reform meant the governments introduced a much lighter 
version of the Robens model than many other countries. 27 
Resource constraints, changing attitudes towards the roles of 
government and business, and a decline in support for worker 
participation all contributed to the light version of the model that 
resulted.28  
 
New Zealand’s experience with a new governance style 
health and safety system exemplifies the very things 
commentators have warned of as being the crucial dangers of 
new governance. It has been cautioned that new governance 
approaches can risk paving the way for neoliberalism and, 
because of the increased role of business, are prone to regulatory 
capture. Leading commentators such as Lobel, Estlund and 
Tucker, all warn that a move to new governance style regulation 
may allow for the dominance of interested parties, and 
ultimately, may fail those it is meant to protect; the workers.29 
Tucker has advised that strong worker activism and provision 
                                                
25  Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment Health and Safety 
Reform Bill Exposure Draft (Parts 1 to 3)  (Wellington, MBIE, October 
2013) (hereinafter Exposure Draft Commentary), at [3]. 
26 The Report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety: 
Executive Report, above note 24, at [11]. 
27 The Report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety: 
Main Report, above note 8, at [20]. 
28 The Report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety: 
Executive Report, above note 24, at [21]-[22]. 
29 Eric Tucker “Old Lessons for New Governance: Safety or Profit and the 
New Conventional Wisdom” (2012) 08 Osgoode CLPE 2, at [13], [17] and 
[25] on each commentators warning. 
14 
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for worker participation is essential for the success of any 
Robens model, and is absolutely necessary:30  
 
… to prevent the regime from degrading into a 
neoliberal regime, in which health and safety would be 
constructed according to management perspectives on 
what was reasonable given the cost constraints under 
which management operates. 
 
In New Zealand, the 1992 Act was introduced with the intention 
that it would facilitate business self-regulation. Its very aim was 
to enhance the role of the private sector in managing health and 
safety, and reduce the role of the regulator. While that aim is 
directly in line with the intentions of the Robens Report itself, 
the Robens model was predicated on strong worker participation 
and stressed the importance of worker involvement. The Report 
recommended that:31 
 
… there should be a statutory duty on every employer 
to consult with his employees or their representatives 
at the workplace on measures for promoting safety and 
health at work. And to provide arrangements for the 
participation of employees in the development of such 
measures. 
 
The Robens Report was released during a time of strong unions 
and strong union membership. However, by the time New 
Zealand promulgated its first Robens style framework, union 
membership was in decline and a culture of anti worker-
participation had taken hold. The 1992 Act introduced a self-
regulatory approach within a system not adequately set up for it. 
Even today, over twenty years later, the penalties are 
significantly inadequate, incentives are too low, the clarity and 
certainty required for self-regulation is absent, and most 
importantly, the ultimate safeguard of worker participation, 
which would balance out the broadly drafted, self-regulatory 
system is lacking. The Act removed what worker participation 
had existed before it, and it was brought back only weakly in the 
                                                
30 Tucker Old Lessons for New Governance, above note 29, at [13], Tucker 
discusses the need for worker participation through the case study of Ontario. 
31 Robens Report, above note 18, at [22]. 
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early 2000’s. 32  The light Robens model introduced in New 
Zealand was destined to fail. 
 
C Current State of Affairs – Regulatory Failure 
 
In such a setting, compliance has been low, and workplace 
injury prevention and health protection efforts have been 
shameful. Taskforce statistics revealed disgraceful injury rates 
twice that of Australia and almost six times that of the United 
Kingdom,33 “more than 100 people each year are killed in the 
workplace and around one in 10 workers are harmed.” 34  A 
further estimated 600-900 New Zealanders die prematurely each 
year from occupational illness.35 To put the gravity of workplace 
health and safety in perspective, in the world at large, more 
people die at work than in wars.36 The importance of securing 
healthy and safe workplaces cannot be overstated, and the 
regulatory framework in New Zealand has failed to deliver.  
 
In summary, the state of regulation today is a closed loop 
of hurdles. Traditional command and control regulation fails 
because it is too complex and inflexible and because there are 
insufficient funds to support oversight and enforcement of a 
strict top-down scheme. The Robens model attempts to 
capitalise on industry expertise and instil in employers a self-
starter approach to OHS through a self-regulatory model made up 
of adaptable, flexible, performance standards. However, when a 
Robens model is introduced in conjunction with the depletion of 
                                                
32 By the Health and Safety in Employment Amendment Act 2002 (NZ). 
33 Andrew Stevens “Urgent step change needed on safety” (19 August 2013) 
The New Zealand Herald < 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=1091
3270>[according to stats provided by the taskforce] 
34 Ibid. 
35 “Major reform of workplace health and safety” (online ed, 7 August 2013, 
at < http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1308/S00096/major-reform-of-
workplace-health-and-safety.htm>) 
36 Department of Communication “World Day for Safety and Health at Work 
– two million work deaths a year: A preventable tragedy” (28 April 2004) 
International Labour Organisation < http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-
ilo/newsroom/features/WCMS_075605/lang--en/index.htm>  
And See; Lobel, Interlocking, above note 14, at [1079], see Lobel 
Interlocking at [1079]-[1080] for more statistics on the cost of occupational 
injury, specifically in the United States. 
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worker participation, weaker unions, and a pull back of 
governmental oversight, as was the case in New Zealand, there 
is insufficient incentive for employers to actively regulate 
themselves. Put simply, New Zealand’s existing self regulatory 
model “fails precisely because receding oversight and 
enforcement risks render their inducements too weal to ensure 
genuine self regulation. 37 
 
Regrettably, this framework has allowed for widespread 
non-compliance, which ultimately led to the Pike River tragedy 
of 2010. The crisis became a catalyst for change, and New 
Zealand moved to re-examine its regulatory framework.  
 
D The Move to Reform 
 
Despite its failures in New Zealand, a Robens model remains the 
preferred approach for regulating workplace health and safety 
across many commonwealth jurisdictions. 38  After recent 
reviews, the United Kingdom and Australia have both confirmed 
their Robens based frameworks, 39  and after careful 
consideration by the Taskforce, Royal Commission and the 
government, New Zealand has decided to follow suit and 
reinvent, but still retain, a Robens model. The all-encompassing 
general duties of a Robens model do not date quickly, they 
support innovation, and provide flexibility.40 Now, more than 
ever, a Robens model is the best equipped to deal with the 
increasingly complex world of work,41 which, will be discussed 
in part IV.  
 
The flaws in New Zealand’s current health and safety 
system are innumerable. The Taskforce found no single critical 
factor behind the poor performance, rather they found 
                                                
37  Timothy P. Glynn “Taking Self-Regulation Seriously: High-Ranking 
Officer Sanctions for Work-Law Violations” (2012) 32 Berkeley Journal of 
Employment & Labor Law 279, at [279] (emphasis added). 
38 Exposure Draft Commentary, above note 25, at [3]. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Exposure Draft Commentary, above note 25 at [3] 
41 See, for example, Tucker Old Lessons for New Governance, above note 29, 
at [14]. 
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“significant weaknesses across the full range of workplace 
health and safety system components, coupled with the absence 
of a single strong element or set of elements to drive major 
improvements or to raise expectations.”42 There is, of course, no 
one measure to fix all the problems, and the proposed reform is 
a large-scale overhaul that touches on almost every aspect of the 
workplace health and safety framework. While it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to analyse every aspect of the reform, it is 
useful to outline, in brief, some of the major features.  
 
1 Features of the proposed reform 
The reform includes new definitions for duty holders, rights 
holders and workplaces, which modernise and expand the 
application of health and safety measures. The concept of a 
workplace is given a very broad definition under the Bill,43 
which was taken directly from the Australian Model Act. 44 
While the definition of workplace is not going to be a 
transformational feature of the new scheme, it will ensure the 
Act has the broadest reach possible and will adapt to the ever-
evolving ‘workplace’. The Model Act also directly inspires the 
framing of the principal duty holder under the Bill. The term 
‘employer’ is removed and is replaced with the broader notion 
of ‘a person conducting a business or undertaking’ (PCBU).45 The 
adoption of the new PCBU term recognises that the traditional 
concept of the employer-employee relationship is only one 
arrangement in the modern world of work.46  The number of 
arrangements involving contractors, subcontractors, franchisors, 
and labour hire has been on the rise, while health and safety 
legislation and its concept of ‘employer’ has failed to keep up. 
Similarly, the term ‘employee’ is removed and replaced by the 
                                                
42 The Report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety: 
Main Report, above note 8, at [20]. 
43 Health and Safety Reform Bill, at s 15; compare with definition of ‘place 
of work’ in s 2 of the Health and Safety in Employment Act. 
44 Model Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Aus) at s 8 
45  Health and Safety Reform Bill, at s 13; compare with definition of 
employer in s 2 of the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992. 
46The Report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety: 
Executive Report, above note 24, at [20]. 
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notion of ‘worker’.47 Again, worker is defined very broadly to 
“recognise the changing nature of work relationships and to 
ensure health and safety protection is extended to all types of 
workers.”48 
 
Aside from definitional changes, the reform also includes 
a refuelled commitment to worker participation.49 Provisions for 
worker participation, input and representatives are significantly 
enhanced under the Bill, which will be of momentous value 
considering a general Robens approach is retained. In a similar 
vein, the protection of representatives, inspectors and whistle-
blowers is increased, a welcome acknowledgement of the part 
those safeguards play in ensuring compliance, and of the power 
inequality present in many relationships within the workplace.50  
 
This paper’s focus however is corporate liability, and in 
particular the new duty of officers.51  The duty of officers is 
closely tied to the primary duty of care, which has been 
broadened and simplified, and the standard of care has been 
raised. The primary duty is laid out in s 30, which provides that 
all PCBU’s have a duty to ensure, so far as reasonably 
practicable, the health and safety of workers engaged, or caused 
to be engaged, by the PCBU or whose activities in carrying out 
work are influenced or directed by the PCBU.52 The officer duty 
is outlined in section 39, which provides that where any PCBU 
has a duty or obligation under the Act, all officers of the PCBU 
must exercise due diligence to ensure that the PCBU complies 
with that duty or obligation.  
 
                                                
47 See, Health and Safety in Reform Bill s 14; compare with definition of 
employee in s 2 of the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 (NZ). See 
also; Model Act, above note 10, s 7. 
48 Richard Johnstone and Michael Tooma Work Health and Safety Regulation 
in Australia: the Model Act (The Federation Press, Sydney, 2012), at [28]. 
See also, Exposure Draft Commentary, above note 25, at [7] “the key concept 
of the worker definition is that it is broader than employee and captures 
contractors and others”. 
49 Health and Safety Reform Bill, Part 3 and s 40. 
50 Health and Safety Reform Bill, Parts 3 and 4. 
51 Health and Safety Reform Bill, s 39. 
52 Health and Safety Reform Bill 2014, s 30.  
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The next section analyses the commercial world and its 
relationship with OHS regulation, revealing an inherent clash 
between the two that plagues the ability of the regulator to 
implement effective corporate liability. 
 
III   OHS and Corporate Liability – the 
Fundamentals 
A The Business Case 
 
The cost of workplace death, injury and illness is great not only 
morally, but also economically. Statistics gathered by the 
Taskforce estimate the economic and social costs of workplace 
injury at around $3.5 billion a year, with the cost of occupational 
illness even greater. 53 The Taskforce confidently concluded that 
New Zealand must devote more resources to prevent ill health, 
injury and death – “and the returns will come in greater quality 
of life for New Zealanders, higher productivity and reduced 
medical costs.”54 In light of this, it is easy, at a national level, to 
make the business case for devoting time and effort to securing 
safe and healthy workplaces. 
 
Unfortunately, despite the moral and financial benefits 
being clear, stimulating firm-level compliance has proved to be a 
great challenge. The central underlying issue is the competitive 
commercial world in which the regulated companies are set. 
While the business case for a country’s economy is easily made, 
the business case for compliance for each individual company is 
less convincing. Capitalism affords a relentless requirement to 
produce for profit, and to privilege profit over all other 
objectives, including safety.55 Eric Tucker recently examined the 
capitalist paradigm and found, that although “[t]his drive does 
                                                
53 Andrew Stevens “Urgent step change needed on safety” (19 August 2013) 
The New Zealand Herald < 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=1091
3270> And see, The Report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace 
Health and Safety: Main Report, above note 8, at [12]. 
54 The Report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety: 
Executive Report, above note 24, at [3]. 
55 Tucker Old Lessons for New Governance, above note 29, at [18]. 
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not always lead to the creation of hazardous working conditions, 
historically it often has, and presently it often does.”56  
 
The inherent clash between OHS regulation and company 
law makes regulating companies in OHS particularly complex, 
and means the effectiveness of corporate liability provisions is 
essential to securing compliance. Given the proliferation of 
incorporated companies in New Zealand, 57  and around the 
world, it has become increasingly important to create effective 
mechanisms aimed specifically at incentivising companies’ 
actions, and company decision makers’ actions. The duty of 
officers can go some lengths to achieving that goal. 
 
B Company Law and Occupational Health and Safety 
Regulation 
 
In order to ensure the proposed reform, specifically the duty of 
officers, can motivate companies and company decision makers 
to comply, the question ‘what are the drivers of corporate 
behaviour’ must be asked. Only once those drivers are identified 
can the ability of the duty to influence corporate behaviour be 
assessed. 
 
1 Company law and directors duties  
The definitive and undeniable driver of corporate behaviour is 
profit. It is the role of all company directors to maximise 
shareholder wealth. Corporate law itself prescribes that role. 
While directors duties are technically owed to the company,58 
because a companies interests are defined by the interests of its 
members, namely, its shareholders, in practice, directors 
discharge their duties by serving the interests (wealth 
                                                
56 Tucker Old Lessons for New Governance, above note 29, at [18]-[19]. 
57 In 1989 there were only 160, 988 companies on the register, as per Bob 
White (ed) The New Zealand Official 1990 Year Book (94th ed Department of 
Statistics, Wellington, 1990), now there are almost 600 000 registered 
companies, as per Companies Office “Statistics” (14 October 2013) 
Companies Office < http://www.business.govt.nz/companies/about-
us/statistics>  
58 Companies Act 1993 (NZ), for example s 131 Duty of directors to act in 
good faith and in the best interests of company 
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maximisation) of the shareholders as a whole.59 At the risk of 
over simplification, given that the driver of corporate behaviour 
is profit, a breach of regulation, that does not adversely affect 
the firm’s surplus, will not amount to a breach of director’s 
duties under corporate law, or at a minimum, will not equal a 
harm to the firm.60 Moreover, when it comes to publicly listed, 
or ‘code’, companies the threat of takeover is ever present, and 
takeover rules largely prevent defensive action. 61  Even if 
directors or managers care about OHS personally, the threat of 
takeover and resulting job loss is a powerful motivator to 
prioritise profit, as the market cares about returns and not much 
else.  
 
In summary, “directors, elected by shareholders to manage 
the affairs of the corporation, have no independent duty to 
ensure firm compliance with work law standards.” Rather, it is 
up to health and safety regulation alone to create rules and 
incentives to alter corporate behaviour and facilitate compliance.   
 
2 Personal drivers within the corporate set-up 
In addition to the operation of directors’ duties under company 
law, directors and managers are usually personally incentivised 
to increase the firm’s surplus. Managers and decision makers 
may have largely unchecked and un-countered “incentives and 
behavioural and normative commitments to maximise the firm’s 
surplus by ignoring possible work-law violations.” 62  Internal 
structures of firms often see that managers are personally 
compensated, 63  whether through promotion, bonuses or other 
                                                
59  Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421. This landmark case found that 
directors only owe fiduciary duties to the company and not to individual 
shareholders, however as a collective, the group of shareholders as a whole, 
make up the company and so we have the view of shareholder primacy. 
60 Glynn Taking Self-Regulation Seriously, above note 37, at [326]. 
61 Takeovers Code Approval Order 2000 (NZ); and See generally; Takovers 
Panel “A Basic Guide for Shareholders about the Takeovers Code” 
(November 2013) < http://www.takeovers.govt.nz/assets/Assets-
2/Shareholders-Basic-Guide-and-Fact-Sheets/4931-Takeovers-BG-booklet-
online-P7FA-HighRes.pdf>. 
62 Glynn Taking Self Regulation Seriously, above note 37, at [323] 
63  Glynn Taking Self Regulation Seriously, above note 37, at [314]. See 
generally, Kimberly Krawiec “Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the 
Principal-Agent Model” (2005) 32 Fla St U L Rev 573 at [599]-[601]. 
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means, for the financial success of the enterprise. Those same 
internal incentives to perform are, more often than not, not 
applicable to non-financial success.  Managers face a very real, 
and personal, performance - versus - compliance conflict, which 
very well may cut the other way in work law, that is, towards 
minimal or noncompliance.64 
 
C Companies and Occupational Health and Safety – in 
light of corporate drivers 
1 The cost benefit equation 
Given that the driver of corporate behaviour and decision-
making is shareholder wealth maximisation, it is clear how firms 
will approach the task of regulatory compliance. Corporate 
actors will adopt a cost-benefit analysis: 65 
  
Straightforward economic models predict that with 
regard to OHS liability, a firm calculates the risk of 
inspection multiplied by the cost of an expected fine, 
resulting in the cost of noncompliance. 
 
If a firm is unlikely to be inspected and fined, then the cost of 
noncompliance is low, and there is little incentive to comply.  
 
Under the current framework, the threat of inspection does 
not hold great value in the equation because of the weakness of 
the regulator. In his recent work on corporate compliance and 
behaviour, Langevoort confirmed that firms have incentives to 
implement less than effective systems of internal controls when 
society under-enforces the law.66 It was the intention of the 1992 
reform to shift the compliance burden to the private sector, and 
to lower both external inspection and internal pressure (from 
workers and unions). The Taskforce reported that currently the 
                                                
64 Glynn Taking Self Regulation Seriously, above note 37, at [322]. See also; 
Doinald C Langevoort “Monitoring: the Behavioural Economics of Corporate 
Compliance with Law” (2002) 71 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 79. 
65 Lobel, Interlocking above note 14 at [1097]. 
66 Donald C Langevoort, above note 64, at [80]. 
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regulator is under resourced and ultimately ineffective.67 Today, 
most firms can expect a very low probability of inspection, 
followed by low penalties, rather low media backlash and 
therefore low reputational damage (unless the breach caused a 
major occupational safety tragedy, such as Pike River). Hence, 
under New Zealand’s current framework, firm-level deterrence 
is severely lacking. 
 
2 Analysing the cost benefit equation 
(a) Other factors in play 
Admittedly, immediate profit is not the only corporate 
motivator, and some companies’ and decision makers’ default 
position may be in favour of compliance. Additionally, there are 
other factors in play in the equation, such as company reputation 
and the productivity and morale of workers which all benefit 
from OHS investment. In fact, according to a 2011 European 
Commission study, for every euro or dollar spent, the ratio of 
pay-off to investment ranges from 1.29 to 2.89 depending on the 
project.68  
 
However, if those numbers actually informed the decisions 
of company officers, compliance levels would be much higher 
than they are today. Logic dictates that in practice, companies 
often view health and safety efforts as a cost not an investment. 
For example, the Royal Commission found that the board of 
Pike River Coal Mine Ltd prioritised production over safety.69 
In its final report, the Commission stated: 70 
 
In the drive towards coal production the directors and 
executive managers paid insufficient attention to health 
                                                
67 The Report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety: 
Main Report, above note 8, at [22] and [39]. And see, Exposure Draft 
Commentary, above note 25, at [296]. 
68  László Andor, European Commissioner responsible for Employment, 
Social Affairs and Inclusion “EU policy on health and safety at work: myths 
and facts” (London, Institute of Occupational Safety and Health Conference, 
26 February 2013).  
69 Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy Final Report 
(Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington, October 2012), at [12], [15]-
[22]. 
70 At [12] and [19] (emphasis added). 
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and safety and exposed the company’s workers to 
unacceptable risks. … [A]t the executive manager level 
there was a culture of production before safety. 
 
In the long run the government and regulators must strive to 
alter that misconception, and change the culture of companies 
towards OHS. In the meantime, however, a more immediate 
remedy to induce compliance is necessary. 
(b) Competition 
In the corporate world, capitalist competition is a force to be 
reckoned with, and when it comes to health and safety 
compliance, it has problematic ramifications. Where compliance 
is far from compulsory in the practical sense, decision makers 
cannot be certain that their competitors will comply. That 
uncertainty causes a ratchet-down effect, where all companies, 
driven by a fear of falling behind the competition, will opt for 
cheaper, and likely less safe, processes.  
(c) Immediate benefits 
Finally, the benefits to be gained from noncompliance are often 
far more clear, tangible and immediate than those of 
compliance. The cost saving from noncompliance are usually 
easily identifiable, both in terms of profit and other benefits to 
those in charge, while any benefit from compliance will often be 
long-term, contingent, or even speculative. 71 This factor has a 
large role in the context of takeovers, as a takeover will not be 
defeated by the possibility of long-term future gains, rather they 
are assessed on the quarterly financial reports. 
 
3 The new governance argument  
Many new governance theorists attempt to argue a business case 
for safe workplaces. Generally, the argument claims; if 
compliance is made easier, clearer and more fit for purpose, 
decision makers are likely to comply because the clash in 
interests between compliance and profit is not that great, and, in 
any event, ‘virtue will triumph over profit.’ 72  This line of 
                                                
71 See generally, Glynn Taking Self Regulation Seriously, above note 37, at 
[313]-[318]. 
72 See, Lobel, Interlocking above note 14 at [1103]-[1104]. 
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thinking relies on the idea that corporate law is structured so that 
directors and officers have broad discretion in determining how 
they run an enterprise, and, for a host of reasons: public 
relations, a personal sense of ethics or risk aversion, firm 
decision makers may seek to promote compliance to a greater 
extent than a cold cost-benefit analysis might predict.73 
 
However, empirical evidence supporting shared interests 
between companies and workers, or supporting the business case 
is found wanting. 74  The reality is that there will be many 
occasions when “hazards … are integral to the production 
process and serve the employers bottom line” and that often 
“health and safety improvements come with a significant price 
tag.”75 Ultimately:76 
 
There is a limit to the extent that managers can indulge 
their personal sense of altruism and/or worker 
friendliness and still be true to their real task.” And 
that real task, as corporate law scholars will tell you, is 
maximization of shareholder value, with all it entails.  
 
D The Fundamental Issue – and How to Counter It 
 
The above clash was succinctly summarised by Tucker when 
discussing the theory of Nichols and Armstrong: 77 
 
The fundamental point is that there is a systematic 
pressure within capitalist economies to privilege profit 
seeking over all other objectives, including OHS, 
whenever those objectives impose a barrier to the 
                                                
73 Glynn Taking Self Regulation Seriously, above note 37, at [305]. 
74 Tucker Old Lessons for New Governance, above note 29, at [22]. 
75 Cynthia Estlund Regoverning the Workplace (New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 2010), at [178]. 
76  Harry Glasbeek “Book Review: Varieties of Capitalism, Corporate 
Governance and Employees” (2008) 22 Austl Jnl of Corp Law 293, at [303]; 
and see also Tucker Old Lessons for New Governance, above note 29, at 
[20]-[26]. 
77 Tucker Old Lessons for New Governance, above note 29, at [19] discussing 
Theo Nichols and Pete Armstrong Safety or Profit: Industrial Accidents & 
the Conventional Wisdom (Falling Wall Press, Bristol, 1973), (hereinafter 
Nichols and Armstrong). 
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circulation and expansion of capital. The development 
of regulation for the benefit of working people involves 
the imposition of limits on the freedom of owners and 
managers of capital to engage in profit seeking at the 
expense of safety.  
 
And so, given that the firm’s bottom line usually is the bottom 
line, where the costs of compliance are high, as is the case in 
health and safety, legal sanctions for violations must be both 
stiff and probable. 78  
 
For sanctions to be probable enough, enforcement through 
inspection must be frequent. That solution requires government 
resources, resources that are not available. That barrier will 
persist in perpetuity. And so there exists a need for additional 
tools to protect the labour force. Nichols and Armstrong offered 
a solution that shifted power over production to workers on the 
shop floor.79 The solution proposed in this paper, and arguably 
by the proposed reform package, is to shift responsibility from 
what is now an abstract ‘employer’ to those in charge day-to-
day, those who make the decisions.  
 
IV     The New World of Work 
 
In addition to the structure of duties under corporate law and the 
drivers of corporate behaviour, another major challenge for 
workplace health and safety regulation is the world of work 
itself. For several decades the New Zealand labour force, along 
with other western economies, has been undergoing extensive 
transformation. The industrial era when factories and 
manufacturing dominated the working world is gone, with the 
influx of the service industry and information age filling the gap.   
 
A Regulating the New World of Work 
 
                                                
78 Glynn Taking Self Regulation Seriously, above note 37, at [318]. 
79 Tucker Old Lessons for New Governance, above note 29 at [3] in reference 
to the theory of Nichols and Armstrong above note 57. 
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The post-industrial era has brought a whole new world of work 
that acts as a double-edged sword for health and safety 
regulation. It brings fresh challenges such as new forms of harm 
and new work arrangements, and makes old regulatory measures 
particularly unsuitable. The modern world of work upsets and 
distorts the very workings and design of regulatory measures 
and demands methods tailored to its specific features, if that 
regulation is to successfully influence behaviour. This challenge 
is true for New Zealand OHS and many other nations. The 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the United 
States has expressly recognised changes in the workforce and 
that those changes require new approaches:80 
 
… these demographic and workplace trends 
complicate the implementation of occupational safety 
and health programs and argue for enforcement, 
training, and delivery systems that are different from 
those that have been relied upon to date. 
 
“There is a need to clarify the responsibilities of all parties with 
real control and influence over OHS” in this new setting. 81 The 
concept of ‘employer’ for example has becomes out-dated, and 
the new definition of PCBU will prove very useful in ensuring 
those with power and control bear the responsibility. However, 
where the PCBU is a company it is the officers that hold the real 
power, for they make the decisions. Hence, the new duty of 
officers is uniquely positioned to help counter several challenges 
posed by the modern economy and labour market.  
 
                                                
80 Occupational Safety & Health Administration OSHA 2003-2008 Strategic 
Management Plan (United States Department of Labor, Washington DC, 
May 2003). 
81 Liz Bluff, Neil Gunningham and Richard Johnstone (eds) OHS Regulation 
for a Changing World of Work (The Federation Press, Sydney, 2004), 
(hereinafter Bluff et al OHS Regulation) at [16]. 
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B New Elements of a New World of Work – and the 
Officer Duty 
1 New harm 
The dominance of the service sector in the post-industrial 
economy has brought with it a “myriad of new risks”. 82 
Increased automation and computation account for an increase 
in muscoskeletal injury, repetitive trauma and stress related 
injury.83 Mental and physical harm caused by work related stress 
is also on the rise, as is workplace bullying. New forms of harm 
are now so prevalent in the workplace that work-related stress 
was officially included in the definition of harm in s 2 of the 
Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 by the Amendment 
Act 2002.84 85  
 
These forms of harm demand a risk management approach 
to health and safety.86 The first most important step is that the 
new forms of harm are acknowledged as real and preventable 
harms of the workplace. Society’s view of ‘occupational injury’ 
needs to extend beyond accidents common to the manufacturing 
and agricultural industries and disasters that hit the headlines. 
New training for decision makers and labour is required to 
transform to a positive, less risk tolerant, health and safety 
culture is needed.  
 
                                                
82 Lobel Interlocking, above note 14, at [1095]. 
83 Ibid; See also, European Agency for Safety and Health at Work Economic 
incentives to improve occupational safety and health: a review from the 
European perspective (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European 
Union, 2010), at [95]-[97], [144], [157] and [170]. 
84  Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992; Health and Safety in 
Employment Amendment Act 2002. 
85 Note, the inclusion of stress and fatigue does not mean that inherently 
stressful work can no longer be performed. Nor does it mean that fatigued 
workers must not work. Rather, it highlights that employer needs to manage 
stress and fatigue by taking account of and addressing these matters. As per 
CCH Stress and Fatigue in the Workplace (15 October 2009) [34-360] at < 
http://intelliconnect.wkasiapacific.com/scion/secure/ctx_library_victoria_ac_
nz_library_resources_online_redirect_100122_html/index.jsp?cpid=WKAP-
TAL-IC#page[6]>.  
86 See, Health and Safety Reform Bill, s 22. 
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Changing the safety culture of a nation requires 
leadership, not only from the government but also from within 
each enterprise. Officers and senior managers are in the best 
leadership position to create that culture change. Their position 
involves enough seniority to demand compliance and enough 
day-to-day involvement to effect actual change. As Bluff et al 
explained, “Responsibility properly lies with those who control 
the generation of risks and who are in a position to eliminate or 
minimise them.” 87 The importance of leadership and culture in 
health and safety is explored in more detail in part VI. 
 
2 New work arrangements 
Another development of the modern economy is a growth in 
more flexible and precarious working arrangements. Businesses 
increasingly “seek to employ part time, temporary, leased and 
subcontracted day labourers and seasonal workers.”88  Certain 
features of these working arrangements cause problems for 
health and safety regulation. Firstly, heightened job insecurity 
weakens labour voice and bargaining powers. It also threatens 
worker whistle-blower functions, thereby removing an important 
safeguard (a loss especially intolerable in a Robens system).  
 
Secondly, the increase in precarious and flexible work 
arrangements inherently involves an increase in lengthy and 
complex production chains.89 The arrangements themselves are 
often “connected by multiple contractual and subsidy links” 
often involving labour hire companies or the like. 90  These 
complex chains create confusion over who is the employer in 
the traditional sense. They create confusion about who is 
responsible for the safety of whom by dividing responsibility, 
and consequently they reduce the likelihood of active 
compliance efforts. 
 
Uncertainty about responsibilities has proved fatal to 
health and safety efforts in New Zealand. In health and safety 
law duties are often contested through the ambiguities of 
                                                
87 Bluff et al OHS Regulation, above note 81, at [14].  
88 Lobel Interlocking above note 14 at [1094] (emphasis added).  
89 Lobel Interlocking, above note 14, at [1094]. 
90 Ibid 
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employer/employee legal definitions. 91  Those ambiguities are 
exacerbated in the new setting of temporary employment and 
complex contractual chains. The new definitions of PCBU and 
worker help ensure all PCBU’s know they are all responsible for 
the health and safety of all those below them in the chain. The 
duty of officers is an invaluable addition to that framework. The 
personal nature of the duty will increase proactivity in OHS, 
while framing the duty as one to ‘exercise due diligence’ will 
bring organisation and structure to the risk management process.  
 
3 Modern pace  
The commercial world has always been a competitive one, 
demanding prudent, commercially savvy decisions and 
development. Nonetheless, as a direct result of the globalised 
market, corporate players today are faced with increased 
competition, which in turn requires increased ingenuity. 
Moreover, the information age means technological and 
production methods change quickly. The accelerated pace and 
growing diversity of work demands flexible work-law standards, 
as Lobel put it, “In a time of radicalized modernity and just-in-
time production, the law must recognise market demands of 
rapid change and adaptability.”92 Traditional, detailed, top-down 
enforcement lacks the adaptability necessary in today’s 
economy as substantive standards can quickly become out-
dated. A major reason to retain a Robens model even now is that 
the flexible performance-based standards suit the fast paced 
market, as industry can adapt and change much faster than 
governmental regulation and guidelines.  
  
Performance based standards also put the onus of the 
substance of compliance on to the private sector, which is better 
positioned to flesh out the details and tools for safe production 
methods. The due diligence duty places the burden of 
responsible decision making on high ranking officers best 
positioned and best equipped to lead change. The PCBU and 
                                                
91 See Orly Lobel “The Slipperiness of Stability: Contracting for Flexible and 
Triangular Employment Relationships in the New Economy” (2003) 10 Tex 
Wesleyan L Rev 109, at [115]-[116]. 
92 Lobel Interlocking, above note 14, at [1093]. 
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officer performance standards capitalise on the inventiveness 
that commerce creates in its participants, by ensuring those high 
up in the competition are responsible for OHS. 
 
4 Decline in union density 
A final significant feature of the new world of work for our 
purposes is the decline in union density, mentioned earlier. 
Union density has been in decline for half a century and in New 
Zealand it reached an all time low in 2013 of 16.6 per cent.93 
The reduction, or in most cases absence, of unions from the 
workplace not only weakens already weak employee bargaining 
power, but it also removes a key safeguard. Unions were once 
an important supplement to governmental efforts to enforce 
work-law standards, and the loss of a labour-force watchdog 
further weakens already insufficient enforcement.  
 
The decline in union density necessitates the introduction 
of a new safeguard; a new measure that encourages and 
demands active compliance. The duty of officers can help fill 
this gap. Under the proposed reform it is the express duty of 
officers to act as a watchdog, their task is to monitor and help 
PCBU’s comply with their primary duty. The role of officers as a 
safeguard under the new duty is discussed further in part VII 
(B). 
 
V The Need for Effective Inducement  
 
The inescapable conclusion drawn from assessing the regulatory 
failure in New Zealand, the new world of work, and, in 
particular, the drivers of corporate behaviour, is that what is 
desperately needed is actual and effective inducement; a tool 
that creates real incentive for compliance. As explained above, 
when companies engage in a cost benefit analysis of health and 
safety compliance, the equation is as follows; the cost of 
                                                
93 According to Companies Office records as cited in Rebecca Stevenson 
“Are unions a good deal for workers?” Stuff (online ed, 08 February 2014, at  
< http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/money/9696643/Are-unions-a-good-deal-
for-workers>).  
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genuine compliance minus the benefits of compliance, such as 
positive reputation, and the cost of sanctions for non-
compliance, discounted by the probability of enforcement. 94 
Where the risk of enforcement is too low, the cost of compliance 
will almost invariably be greater than the cost of non-
compliance, and the drivers of corporate decision-making 
remain unaltered.95 The risk of enforcement is too low in New 
Zealand, by cause of the regulatory breakdown. 
 
Consequently, a new tool that alters norms at the top of the 
decisional hierarchy is needed. The question is; how can the 
government change the result of the above equation, what tools 
are available to make the cost of compliance for companies 
lower than the cost of noncompliance, or at least to make risk 
taking less appealing? Increasing maximum penalties for 
violations can have a certain impact. However, higher penalties 
alone cannot wholly transform the equation because the threat 
will only be real if inspection and ultimately penalty is made 
much more likely. That can only happen at great expense to the 
government, through the dedication of many resources to 
inspection and enforcement. The Department of Labour, as it 
then was, acknowledged that the amount of funding provided to 
prevent workplace harm is significantly less than what is 
actually required. 96  More recently, the Taskforce also 
highlighted the need for higher resource allocation.97 While the 
Government has heeded this advice, and more funding will be 
dedicated to OHS under the reform, it alone will not increase 
inspections enough to tip the balance and alter the equation. The 
best results in OHS regulation will be delivered by a varied 
system. No single approach to public policy can capture the 
complexities of workplace risk, the roles of participants and the 
                                                
94 Glynn Taking Self Regulation Seriously, above note 37, at [316], (emphasis 
added). 
95 Glynn Taking Self Regulation Seriously, above note 37, at [303]. 
96  National Occupational Health and Safety Advisory Committee 
Occupational Health and Safety in New Zealand: NOHSAC: Technical 
Report 7, above note 19, at [Executive Summary]. 
97 The Report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety: 
Main Report, above note 8, at [96], [120], [123], [130]; See also, Royal 
Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy Final Report, above note 
69, Chapter 18 at [250] on ‘resources available to regulator’, and at [283]-
[285]. 
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elements that drive their behaviour. 98 Hence, the success of the 
corporate liability reform depends on its being a multifaceted 
one, where increased penalties play their part a long side other 
measures. 
 
There are of course various motivating levers, as the 
Taskforce describes them, available to governments to 
incentivise compliance beyond increasing penalties. 99  Those 
levers include both carrots and sticks and range from the 
provision of information, to ACC deductions, to business 
opportunities through procurement. 100  Yet the goal for every 
measure is the same, to increase compliance, whether through 
encouragement or compulsion. When looking at the various 
levers available it helps to break up the role of incentive tools. 
Incentives can be targeted at the company itself, the workers, or 
the decision makers. Targeting workers may succeed on 
occasion, however heightened job insecurity and the sheer 
power of corporations limit this options success by weakening 
worker voice. As discussed, existing regulatory approaches have 
also failed to adequately incentivise the company itself, or in 
traditional terms, the ‘employer’, and in the absence of sufficient 
firm level sanction, the decision makers are also not 
incentivised; their drivers remain tied to those of the firm.101  
 
Hence, the only way to further induce the compliance of 
companies is to target the decision makers themselves. In light 
of this, one of the most important functions of the duty of 
officers is its role as an incentive creator. Put simply, “where 
noncompliance incentives cannot be addressed adequately or 
reliably at the enterprise level, compliance still can be achieved 
by altering incentives of the firm’s primary decision makers.”102 
OHS regulation must move away from its near exclusive reliance 
on enterprise or employer liability and turn to simultaneously 
incentivise and target officers themselves. This is accomplished 
                                                
98 Lobel, Interlocking, above note 14, at [1141]. 
99 See generally, The Report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace 
Health and Safety: Main Report, above note 8, on ‘Motivating Levers’ at 
[75]. 
100 Ibid. 
101Glynn Taking Self Regulation Seriously, above note 37, at [283]. 
102 Glynn Taking Self Regulation Seriously, above note 37, at [323]. 
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through the officer due diligence duty and the recalibrated 
penalty provisions, which make corporate officers personally 
accountable, with threat of increased sanction, for health and 
safety systems. 
 
A A Personal Duty with Personal Incentives 
 
The personal nature of the duty of officers ensures it fulfils its 
inducement role. Directing legal bite at decision makers 
personally is arguably enough to motivate compliance in and of 
itself, regardless of increased penalties or the like. The risk 
taking behaviour that has defined so many companies’ response 
to health and safety compliance would be less appealing to those 
in charge if they personally were to bare the cost of the fine. As 
Glynn noted, principal decision makers within firms “would 
approach compliance with far greater vigour if they were bound 
personally to do so.”103  There is merit in that logic, and the 
proposed penalty provisions, outlined below, add to its impact. 
 
B Fines and Penalties 
 
Sections 42, 43 and 44 of the Bill provide that the new increased 
penalties apply to all duties under subpart 1 or 2 of the Act, 
which includes the officer due diligence duty. A breach by an 
officer that exposes an individual to risk of death or serious 
injury and involves reckless conduct receives the highest penalty 
under the bill; a term of imprisonment not exceeding 5 years or 
a fine not exceeding $600,000 or both. 104  A lesser fine of 
$150,000 may be imposed for a failure to comply with the due 
diligence duty, where that failure exposes an individual to risk 
of death or serious injury,105 while a fine not exceeding $50,000 
may be imposed for a simple failure to comply with the duty.106 
                                                
103 Glynn Taking Self Regulation Seriously, above note 37, at [345]. 
104 Health and Safety Reform Bill 2014, s 42 
105 Section 43. 
106 Section 44. 
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Section 24 provides that the duty is not transferable,107 and s 29 
states that officers cannot contract out of their duty.108  
 
Under the current framework fines imposed for breaches 
of OHS are shockingly low. The Exposure Draft commentary 
identified low penalties as a major flaw in the New Zealand 
framework.109 The penalties in the Act itself and especially as 
applied by the courts have been too low to incentivise 
compliance. The commentary revealed that 55 per cent of all 
fines imposed are less than $30,000 and 92 per cent are less than 
$50,000. 110  These low fine levels undermine the general 
deterrent effect and send signals that offences in health and 
safety are less serious. The three-tiered system of offences and 
the corresponding graduated (and increased) penalties will 
provide better guidance to courts about appropriate fine 
levels.111  
 
Lastly, financial penalties are not always effective in 
punishing and incentivising companies. Companies can pass on 
monetary penalties to consumers or contractors through elevated 
prices. The personal nature of the officer duty addresses this 
problem with the traditional employer-centric approach, as 
officers cannot pass on their loss and are precluded from 
insuring themselves against financial liability.112  
 
                                                
107 Section 24. 
108 Section 29. 
109 Exposure Draft Commentary, above note 25, at [4]. 
110 At [12]. 
111 Ibid. 
112  The Health and Safety Reform Bill has retained a provision from the 
Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, which precludes insurance 
against fines imposed under the Act. That provision can now be found in 
section 178 of the Bill. It is of note that this important provision was retained 
as no such provision exists in the Australian Model Act 2011 from which 
New Zealand has borrowed so extensively. Australia’s lack of an anti-
indemnification provision has caused problems in health and safety cases, as 
where indemnification is allowed, the coercive effect of the threat of penalty 
is completely undermined, See Hillman v Ferro Con (SA) Pty Ltd and Anor 
[2013] SAIRC 22, see also Neil Foster “You can’t do that! Directors insuring 
against criminal WHS penalties” (2012) 23 Insurance Law Journal 109. 
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VI      The Importance of Leadership and Culture 
Setting 
 
The importance of leadership in workplace health and safety 
cannot be overstated. It is essential that there is perceivable 
dedication to health and safety affairs, right from the upper 
echelons of each corporation, if there is any hope of that 
dedication filtering through the corporate hierarchy right down 
to the workers on the shop floor.113 Firm-level compliance is 
heavily reliant on the attitude and actions of high-ranking 
officers towards health and safety matters. As Michael Tooma 
has observed, “[w]here there is no safety leadership from senior 
employees, the system is almost set up to fail.”114  
 
A Culture Setting – The Role of Officers’ 
 
The most important form of leadership in health and safety is 
not leadership by the government, but rather the leadership 
within each enterprise, because that is the leadership that can 
alter the culture of the firm. In 2004 the International Labour 
Organization announced that the key component for injury 
prevention at work is developing a culture of safety. 115 
Similarly, the Taskforce re-affirmed in the New Zealand context 
that “leadership is vital to creating a workplace culture in which 
health and safety automatically comes first.”116 The health and 
safety culture in New Zealand was singled out by the Taskforce 
as one of the greatest challenges to improving the country’s 
                                                
113 See, R Flin and S Yule, above note 13, at [ii45] “Senior managers have a 
prime influence on the organisation’s safety culture. They need to 
continuously demonstrate a visible commitment to safety.” 
114 Michael Tooma “Lessons for Australian PCBUs from the Pike River coal 
mine royal commission” (19 December 2012) Norton Rose Fulbright 
 < 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/73659/lessons-
for-australian-pcbus-from-the-pike-river-coal-mine-royal-commission>.  
115 International Labour Organisation “The ILO Report for World Day for 
Safety and Health at Work 2004” (28 April 2004) ILO 
<http://www.ilo.org/legacy/english/protection/safework/worldday/products04
/report04_eng.pdf>, at [24]-[25]. See also Lobel, Interlocking above note 14 
at [1103].  
116 The Report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety: 
Main Report, above note 8, at [40]. 
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health and safety record.117 The Chair of the Taskforce declared 
that if New Zealand is to improve its record, it will require a 
seismic shift in attitude and a fundamental change to the 
prevailing ‘she’ll be right’ culture.118  By creating health and 
safety leaders, the duty of officers will be fundamental to 
achieving that shift. As a positive duty, placed on decision 
makers personally, it charges each of them with the task of 
“providing leadership in health and safety for their 
organisation,”119 thereby ensuring a culture shift is initiated at 
the top of each company. 
 
B Creating a Health and Safety Leader 
 
Flin and Yule studied the importance of leadership in creating 
healthy and safe workplaces.120 Through the case study of the 
healthcare sector, they concluded leadership has a significant 
impact on safety compliance and that the best results come from 
participatory and communicative leadership, rather than 
instructive top down efforts.121 The proposed duty facilitates this 
role perfectly, by requiring officers to be continuously active in 
health and safety. 122  The duty does not simply require that 
officers give top down instructions, or that they create strategies 
‘on paper’, rather it demands more participatory active 
monitoring and continuous understanding of day-to-day health 
and safety issues. 123  Here, the proposed duty addresses the 
concerns of the Royal Commission about active participation of 
leaders. The Commission severely criticised the board of Pike 
River Coal Mine Ltd, finding that “the board did not provide 
effective health and safety leadership to protect the workforce 
                                                
117 The Report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety: 
Main Report, above note 8 at [31-32]. 
118 The Report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety: 
Main Report, above note 8, at [5] and [31]. 
119 Exposure Draft Commentary above, note 25, at [12]. 
120 R Flin and S Yule, above note 13. 
121 See generally, R Flin and S Yule, above note 13.  
122 Health and Safety Reform Bill, s 39, in particular section 39(2)(f). 
123  Neil Foster “Recent Developments in personal Liability of Company 
Officers for Workplace Safety Breaches – Austrlian and UK decisions” 
(paper presented to the Seventh National OHS regulatory research 
Colloquium, Canberra, February 2009; NRCOHSR WP No 63), at [31]. 
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from harm,”124 a factor the Commission saw as instrumental to 
many health and safety failures of the company. In conclusion, 
the Commission found that “it is essential that directors and 
those in equivalent positions rigorously review and monitor their 
organisation’s compliance with health and safety law and best 
practices.”125 
 
1 High-ranking officers in particular 
In order for the officer duty to make a health and safety leader of 
each officer, the duty must target high-ranking officers in 
particular. High-ranking officers frequently wield the most de 
facto power in a business enterprise.126 While the Board may 
technically be at the top of the hierarchy, shareholders, the 
public, and most importantly for the purposes of health and 
safety, the workers, see officers as the firm’s top leadership. 
Moreover, as the day-to-day decision makers, senior managers 
generally set the direction of firm policy. Their decisions affect 
the priorities, attitudes and behaviours of all those further down 
the hierarchy, including both lower level managers and 
workers.127  
 
Of utmost importance is the fact that decision makers at 
higher levels have the authority to commit resources to health 
and safety matters. In fact, it is an express aspect of the concept 
of due diligence under the Bill that officers ensure appropriate 
resources are available for use in health and safety compliance, 
and to verify that use. 128  The resource allocation role is 
important of several levels. Obviously, it is important in and of 
itself that resources are dedicated to compliance efforts, as risks 
would be unmanageable without sufficient funds, time and 
people. However a less apparent significance is that the very 
dedication of those resources is an indication to all members of 
the company that health and safety compliance is considered a 
                                                
124 Royal Commission Final Report, above note 69, at [18]. 
125 Royal Commission Final Report, above note 69, at [33]. 
126 Glynn Taking Self Regulation Seriously, above note 37, at [326]. 
127 See Flin and Yule, above note 13, at [ii46] ‘higher level managers may 
have a greater degree of influence on workers’ safety behavior than 
supervisors.’ 
128 Health and Safety Reform Bill, s 39(2)(c) and (f). 
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legitimate and imperative undertaking.129 In the corporate world 
money talks, and the very allocation of resources to compliance 
efforts gives health and safety a status within the firm, which 
will encourage a positive health and safety culture.  
 
At the moment, the New Zealand framework suffers from 
inadequate leadership from a large number of people who have 
influence in the workplace,130 all the while the common theme 
in the literature is that effective internal compliance requires 
genuine buy-in by managers at top levels. 131  The proposed 
officer duty is the first sign that New Zealand is heeding that 
advice, and attempting to address the gaping leadership hole in 
its health and safety regulation.  
 
VII  The Officer Duty 
 
The due diligence duty placed on officers has the opportunity to 
be uniquely helpful, far beyond creating a leadership role and 
producing real and effective incentive. The duty, whether 
intentionally or not, specifically addresses several of the flaws 
identified as significantly contributing to New Zealand’s 
regulatory failure. This paper proposes that the officer duty has 
the singular most transformational capacity of all the individual 
features of the reform. In light of its potential, the next part of 
the paper will analyse the duty itself, as proposed and drafted, to 
evaluate its potential and also to highlight its flaws with the aim 
that once isolated, those flaws can be removed or addressed.  
 
                                                
129R Flin and S Yule, above note 13, at [48]-[49]. And see, Great Britain 
Reducing error and influencing behaviour (Suffolk, HSE Books, 1999). 
130 The Report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety: 
Main Report, above note 8, at [25]. 
131 Glynn Taking Self Regulation Seriously, above note 37, [331] See for 
example; Kimberly Krawiec “Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the 
Principal-Agent Model” (2005) 32 Fla St U L Rev 573, at [577] (citing 
numerous studies); Doinald C Langevoort “Monitoring: the Behavioural 
Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law” (2002) 71 Colum. Bus. L. 
Rev. 79, at [108-09] and [110] (discussing agents‘ need to perceive senior 
management‘s commitment on integrity-based matters). 
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A The Traditional Approach to Regulating Officers 
 
Corporate law generally ignores the role of officers except in 
their capacity as directors or when they exert direct influence 
over board members. Substantive corporate law does not impose 
any meaningful duty on supervisory personnel to prevent, detect 
or correct violations of work law standards.132 Health and safety 
law’s approach to officers is arguably worse, not only are they 
largely overlooked, but when the role of officers is considered in 
legislation, that legislation has utterly failed to incentivise at all.  
 
The Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, in force 
today, only targets officers in a conditional way. Under s 56 the 
law holds directors and officers of bodies corporate liable only 
when they direct, authorise, assent to, acquiesce in, or 
participate in a health and safety failure.133 Under this provision, 
officers have no independent duty to actively ensure health and 
safety standards are adhered to, nor do they have a duty to 
monitor for or prevent illegal conduct within the enterprise. 
Rather, as a direct result of the framing of s 56, officers and 
directors are incentivised to ignore health and safety matters, as 
they are better protected from liability by removing themselves 
altogether.134 The proposed duty requires officers to be involved 
and proactive in ensuring their PCBUs comply with OHS 
standards,135 and is a deliberate shift away from accessorial or 
attributed liability. 136  Under the new provision, ignorance of 
risks or violations will not help officers avoid liability.  
 
B The Officer Duty 
 
The duty of officers is set out in s 39, pt 2, subpt 2, of the Health 
and Safety Reform Bill. The section states that if any PCBU has a 
                                                
132 Glynn Taking Self Regulation Seriously, above note 37, at [325]. 
133 Health and Safety in Employment Act, s 56. 
134 For example, R v P&O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd (1991) 93 Cr App 
Rep 72. 
135 Cherie Holland and Donald Charrett “Work health and safety in Australia 
– the current state of play” (2013) Australian Construction Law Bulletin 46, 
at [49]. 
136 Work Health and Safety Bill 2011 Explanatory Memorandum 2010-1011 
(Australia), at [21]. 
Victoria University of Wellington, Faculty of Law, LAWS 582, Stella 
Kasoulides Paulson  
 41
duty or obligation under the Act, then officers of that PCBU must 
exercise due diligence to ensure that the PCBU complies with that 
duty or obligation.137 The provision goes on to establish that, for 
the purposes of the Act, due diligence involves:138 
(a) having up to date knowledge of OHS matters; 
(b) understanding the nature of operations of the business of 
the PCBU and of the hazards and risks associated with 
those operations; 
(c) ensuring the PCBU has available for use and uses 
appropriate resources and processes to eliminate or 
minimise those risks; 
(d) ensuring the PCBU has appropriate processes for 
receiving and considering information regarding 
incidents, hazards and risks, and for responding to that 
information in a timely way; 
(e) ensuring that PCBU has, and implements, processes for 
complying with any duty or obligation of the PCBU under 
the Act; and 
(f) verifying the provision and use of the resources and 
processes referred to in (c) to (e). 
 
1 Due Diligence 
By framing the duty as a duty to exercise due diligence, the Act 
charges officers with a monitoring role. Their function in health 
and safety is to facilitate the compliance of the person 
conducting a business or undertaking. With regard to the 
primary duty of care, set out in s 30, the officers duty is to 
exercise due diligence to ensure the PCBU is able to - and is in 
fact – ensuring, so far as reasonably practicable, the health and 
safety of workers. In this way, officers are not under a personal 
duty to protect the health and safety of workers. Rather, their 
duty is to actively and continuously oversee and facilitate 
compliance and ensure the health and safety affairs of the 
business are in order.139 
                                                
137 Health and Safety Reform Bill, s 39(1). 
138 Section 39(2), paraphrased.  
139 See Insp Kumar v Ritchie [2006] NSWIRComm 323, in particular at [177] 
where Haylen J outlines the continuous active nature of due diligence as 
‘lay[ing] down a proper system to provide [compliance] … and provid[ing] 
adequate supervision to ensure that the system [is] properly carried out’ 
(emphasis added). In that case the provision in question was section 26 of the 
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Corporate officers and directors are no strangers to the 
concept of due diligence or the responsibilities it entails. 
Although various phrasing is used, many pieces of legislation 
that govern the activities of directors and senior managers 
require due diligence.140 141 As directors and senior managers 
already owe duties of due diligence, the health and safety 
element can easily be conceived of as an extension of their 
existing due diligence duties.  
 
It is universally agreed that the current framework of 
duties is confusing.142 It fails to make expectations clear and 
duty holders have difficulty knowing what to do in order to meet 
their obligations.143 That uncertainty has proved lethal, making 
compliance more complex and in turn less likely.144 The due 
diligence duty of officers is an ideal measure to counter an 
uncertain past. Managers and directors, already well acquainted 
with the requirements and processes of due diligence, will know 
and understand what is expected of them.  
 
A final point with regard to the due diligence aspect of the 
duty is the fact that the concept of due diligence itself has been 
defined. When a list like the one in s 39(2) is created there is 
always a danger that matters that have been omitted from the list 
may be excluded from consideration down the line.145 However, 
the definition is an inclusive one, and courts generally refrain 
from limiting a concept unless the legislature has shown an 
                                                                                                     
Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW) which provided officers 
with a defence to liability if they had exercised due diligence.  
140 For example, the Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013, Securities Markets 
Act 1988, and Companies Act 1993.  
141  See for example, Companies Act s 137 ‘duty to exercise care and 
diligence’ and s 128 ‘duty to manage the affairs of the company’. The 
statutory duties undeniably combine to require due diligence.  
142 The Report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety: 
Main Report, above note 8, at [21]-[23]. 
143 Exposure Draft Commentary, above note 25, at [3]. 
144 The Report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety: 
Main Report, above note 8, at [22]-[25] and [48]. 
145 Neil Foster “Leading the Safety Conversation as a Manager: Exercising 
Due Diligence in Workplace Safety on the Frontline” (paper presented to the 
Comcare National Conference, 19-21 September 2012), (hereinafter Foster 
Leading the Safety Conversation), (no pinpoint available). 
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express intention to do so. Additionally, in the past Australian 
courts have taken a broad approach to interpreting duties, 
requiring “vigilance and a proactive, structured and systematic 
approach to identifying and controlling hazards in all aspects of 
their operations”.146 Thus, it is likely that where an action is 
sensibly one that should be taken in the exercising of due 
diligence, if New Zealand courts follow the approach of 
Australian courts, that action will be considered a necessary 
aspect of due diligence.  
 
2 A Negligence Based Standard 
The standard required for the officer’s duty is akin to a 
negligence standard. While their duty is to exercise due 
diligence to ensure the PCBU complies with their duties under 
the Act, due diligence itself involves only taking reasonable 
steps.147 Perfect legal compliance is unachievable, and to require 
more than ‘reasonable steps to ensure’ would create great 
confusion. Demanding an impossible standard would undermine 
the entire duty by making it impracticable and subject to great 
alteration by the courts. The adopted negligence based standard 
will be beneficial to the operation of the duty in numerous ways, 
some of which are outlined below. 
(a) Capitalising on the ability of officers 
As discussed in Part IV, a performance based standard like that 
in s 39 capitalises on the know-how, competitive, and inventive 
environment of the corporate world. The broad based duty 
avoids the inefficiencies of an externally mandated internal 
control system, and allows each company’s officers to determine 
their own firm specific structures. A prescriptive standard would 
not only lack the flexibility necessary for a duty that applies to a 
multitude of officers, in various roles within diverse companies, 
                                                
146  Richard Johnstone, Michael Quinlan and David Walters “Statutory 
Occupational Health and Safety Workplace Arrangements for the Modern 
Labour Market” (2005) 47 The Journal of Industrial Relations 93, at [97]. See 
WorkCover Authority of NSW (Inspector Egan) v Atco Controls Pty Ltd 
[1998] 82 IR 80, at [85]; WorkCover Authority of New South Wales 
(Inspector Patton) v Fletcher Constructions Australia Ltd [2002] 
NSWIRComm 316, at [78], Inspector Ching v Bros Bins Systems Pty Ltd; 
Inspector Ching v Expo Pty Ltd t/as Tibby Rose Auto [2004] NSWIRComm 
197 at [32].  
147 Health and Safety Reform Bill, s 39(2). 
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but it would also fail to exploit the ingenuity of corporate actors. 
Officers operate in an ever-competitive setting, and are well 
practiced in facilitating and encouraging cost-efficiency. By 
simultaneously allowing officers to develop their own systems, 
and incentivising them to do so, those systems are likely to be fit 
for purpose, efficient and effective.  
 
Moreover, Timothy Glynn proposes that a duty of this 
kind will “facilitate the migration towards industry best 
practices as officers, concerned about sanctions but incentivised 
to perform, will seek to follow industry leaders in developing 
genuinely effective but also cost efficient internal controls and 
cultures.” Creating best practices through guidelines would 
usually be the task of government regulators, however through 
the officer’s duty, industry itself will take on the role, saving 
regulators valuable time and money.  
(b) No scentier requirement 
A scentier requirement may make the novel duty more 
acceptable, or less controversial, to the high-powered players to 
whom it applies, however it would diminish its efficacy 
considerably. Violations tend to occur at lower levels of 
companies, for that is where the action is, and the masses are. 
Establishing knowledge on the part of high-ranking officers in 
these situations would be difficult, not to mention requiring 
scentier would likely produce the same undesirable incentives 
that the traditional approach to officer liability has. 148  If an 
officer cannot be liable without knowledge, they will be deterred 
from discovering violations or even incentivised to “[create] 
layers of bureaucracy to shield officers from knowledge of 
underlying violations.”149 The objective standard proposed in s 
39 will not have this perverse effect, because officers will be 
accountable wherever reasonable steps could have been taken 
that were not. Cases will be tested according to the objective 
standard, and subjective knowledge, or lack thereof, will not 
offer protection from liability. 
                                                
148 See, ‘Traditional Approach to Regulating Officers’ page 31. 
149 Glynn Taking Self Regulation Seriously, above note 37, at [335]. 
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(c) Not Strict Liability 
A strict liability standard would also be less effective than the 
proposed negligence based standard. While strict liability would 
certainly induce officers to ensure the PCBU has systems in place 
to prevent misconduct, it would not induce them to encourage 
systems that find and correct existing violations. Rather, strict 
liability would induce officers to hide violations ex post,150 and 
would likely foster a culture of covering and underreporting 
health and safety problems. Such a practice would eliminate the 
learning opportunities that are the only upside of accidents.  
 
The duty will not, and should not be expected, to create 
perfect compliance. Rather, it will force all officers to ensure 
their companies have up-to-date well-resourced systems and 
pro-active measures in place to manage the risks of their specific 
workplaces.  
 
3 The duty to monitor – a new (private-sector funded) 
safeguard 
High-ranking officers are well positioned to supervise a 
companies’ health and safety performance, which is exactly 
what the due diligence duty requires. The personal due diligence 
duty essentially requires that officers actively monitor 
compliance. 151  The duty facilitates oversight where oversight 
might otherwise be lacking. As mentioned above, inspection and 
enforcement is not sufficiently high to compel compliance, and 
resource constraints mean that insufficiency is not easily solved. 
Moreover, as the decline in union density and increasing job 
insecurity has removed non-governmental safeguards, today 
more than ever OHS is in dire need of a new safeguard. The due 
diligence duty placed on officers creates a monitor who has a 
personal interest in performing the function, without draining 
precious resources. 
 
If the duty were constricted to applying to top-level 
directors alone, the monitoring and oversight function would be 
lost in mid and large sized firms. While top-level directors are 
                                                
150 Ibid. 
151 Health and Safety Reform Bill, s 39(2). 
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integral to setting the health and safety culture, they are often far 
removed from the day-to-day running of the firm and are thus ill 
suited to monitor activities. Glynn notes that mid and lower 
level managers may sometimes be better situated to detect 
unlawful conduct because they are closer to the action and are 
able to devote more time to monitoring. 152  However, these 
employees are too low in the hierarchy to perform the leadership 
function, and are lacking in decision-making, resource allocation 
and culture setting areas. 
 
Finally, there is a hidden danger in failing, as New 
Zealand has, to motivate officers. In the absence of the officer 
duty or a similar provision, directors and officers are likely to 
view monitors and whistle-blowers as potential adversaries. 
When officers are left unmotivated the basic incentive of 
corporate decision-making, maximising the firm’s surplus, 
remains the central driver, and any whistle-blower is an obstacle 
to the core mission of making money. 
 
C Limits of the Duty as Drafted 
 
The officer duty is by no means a saviour provision, to fix every 
flaw in New Zealand’s health and safety regulatory framework. 
There are challenges to OHS regulation that the officer duty can 
never be expected to address, where other aspects of the reform 
will be more important. However, there are also flaws in the 
drafting of the officer duty that require attention before the Bill 
is given royal assent, or that at least must be addressed in an 
interpretation guide, so as to ensure the duty fulfils its true 
potential.  
 
The Taskforce emphasised that in order for the regulatory 
system to function it is imperative that duty holders are 
absolutely clear about their obligations. As previously 
discussed,153 the fact that the duty has been framed as a duty to 
exercise due diligence provides clarity, because officers are 
                                                
152 Glynn Taking Self Regulation Seriously, above note 37, at [329]. 
153 See ‘Due Diligence’ from page 32. 
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familiar with the due diligence concept. However, uncertainty 
and ambiguities persist in the duty as drafted.  
 
1 Definitions 
(a) Who is an Officer and when will they be liable? The 
concept of relative control: 
Obviously, the duty applies to ‘officers’ of the PCBU, what is less 
clear, is who exactly will qualify as an officer and in what 
circumstances they will be liable. Section 12 of the Bill defines 
an officer as:154 
 
(a) If the PCBU is 
(i) a company, any person occupying the position of 
a director of the company, by whatever name 
called; 
(ii) [not a company], any person occupying a 
position that is comparable with that of a director 
of a company  
(b) includes any person who makes decisions that affect the 
whole, or a substantial part, of the business of the PCBU. 
 
At first instance, the definition seems rather comprehensive, 
however real ambiguities exist which endanger the usefulness of 
the duty. The phrase in (b) ‘decisions that affect the whole, or a 
substantial part, of the business of the PCBU’ is inherently vague. 
In the health and safety context, that phrase has its origins in the 
judicial interpretation of s 26 of the New South Wales 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (since repealed), 
which placed liability on directors and those ‘concerned in the 
management’ of the corporation.155 The phrase in (b) was taken 
                                                
154 Health and Safety Reform Bill, s 12 definition of ‘officer’. 
155  Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW) (Aus), section 26. 
Section 26 placed liability on directors and those ‘concerned in the 
management’ of the corporation. The phrase ‘decisions that affect the whole 
or a substantial part of the business’ comes directly from court decisions 
considering the meaning of ‘concerned in the management’ from the section 
26 definition. See for example, Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Bracht 
[1989] VR 821. See generally Neil Foster “Leading the Safety Conversation 
as a Manager: Exercising Due Diligence in Workplace Safety on the 
Frontline” (paper presented to the Comcare National Conference, 19-21 
September 2012). 
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from court decisions considering the meaning of the expression 
‘concerned in the management. 156  In McMartin v Newcastle 
Wallsend Coal Company Staunton J summarised the judicial 
approach to ‘concerned in the management’ and concluded that 
it focuses on a person’s decision-making powers, which must be 
able to “affect the whole or a substantial part of the 
corporation”. 157  Her Honour went on to specify that “the 
person’s decision making powers must be such as to directly 
influence the corporation in relation to the act or omission that 
constituted the offence of the corporation”. 158  That line of 
thinking introduces the idea of relative control to the officer 
duty.  
 
The problem is that introducing the concept of control to 
the question of liability under s 39 could have far-reaching 
implications, it may result in an officers’ liability being 
restricted by the specific area or department over which they 
reside. For example, will chief executive officers, chief financial 
officers, operations managers and human resources managers all 
be equally responsible for all areas of health and safety?159 Or, 
will different kinds of officers have different responsibilities 
relative to their degree of control? The point here is; does the 
judicial history of the definition open the door to a common law 
‘defence’, where an officer may avoid liability by arguing their 
lack of influence or control in relation to the breach? To put 
such a defence into perspective, in the broadest sense it could be 
argued that no officer had sufficient influence in relation to a 
violation other than the companies’ appointed health and safety 
officer. While it is very unlikely that such a broad-based defence 
would ever be developed, the ambiguity here gives reason for 
concern. 160   
                                                
156 Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Bracht [1989] VR 821, at [830]. 
157 McMartin v Newcastle Wallsend Coal Company Pty Ltd and ors [2004] 
NSWIRComm 202, at [885]. 
158 Ibid, emphasis added. 
159 See generally, Queensland Government “Submission to the National OHS 
Review: A National OHS System for the Modern World” (2008). 
160 Note: who qualifies as a ‘director’ is also far from settled, however, that 
uncertainty is almost impossible to avoid in this context. See for example 
Fatupaito v Bates [2001] 3 NZLR 386; (2001) 9 NZCLC 262,583 (HC); 
Dairy Containers Ltd v NZI Bank Ltd [1995] 2 NZLR 30, Re Tasbin Ltd (No 
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What is clear, at least, is that many people may owe the 
same duty under the Act and that each of them individually must 
still comply with that duty to the standard required, as outlined 
in s 26,161 and that each of those people must consult and co-
ordinate their activities.162  
 
(b) Ambiguities and the relationship between provisions  
A concerning feature of the Bill in general is the complex chain 
of relationships between the various provisions and duties, and 
the explicated definitions therein. The officer duty is a duty to 
‘ensure’ PCBU’s comply with their duty.163 The PCBU’s primary 
duty is a duty to ‘ensure’ the health and safety of workers, so far 
as reasonably practicable.164 Section 22 defines the PCBU duty to 
ensure health and safety, as requiring a person to ‘eliminate risks 
so far as reasonably practicable, and if it is not reasonably 
practicable to eliminate the risks, then to minimise those risks, 
so far as reasonably practicable’.165  
 
Thus, when all the provisions are put together, the duty of 
an officer is to ‘exercise due diligence to ensure’ that the PCBU 
‘ensures so far as reasonably practicable’ the health and safety 
of workers by ‘eliminating risks so far as reasonably 
practicable’, and when ‘not reasonably practicable, to minimise 
risks so far as reasonably practicable’.  
  
‘Reasonably practicable’ is also defined,166  as requiring 
duty holders to weigh up relevant matters, such as the likelihood 
of the hazard or risk, the degree of potential harm, knowledge of 
the risk, available ways to minimise risk (and knowledge of 
those ways) and the cost associated with minimising the risk, 
                                                                                                     
3) [1992] CA, Gilles Bakery Ltd v Gillespie [2013] NZHC 1608; Aquaheat 
New Zealand Ltd v Hi Seat Ltd (in liq and rec) [2013] NZGC 1438; and 
Delegat v Norman [2012] NZHC 2358. 
161 Health and Safety Reform Bill, s 26. 
162 Health and Safety Reform Bill, s 27 (risk of $20,000 fine). 
163 Health and Safety Reform Bill, s 39. 
164 Health and Safety Reform Bill, s 30. 
165 Health and Safety Reform Bill, s 22. 
166 Health and Safety reform Bill, s 17.  
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including whether the cost is grossly disproportionate to the 
risk.167  
 
In his examination of this relationship Neil Foster focused 
on the word ‘ensure’.168 Foster found that, while appearing to 
define the PCBU primary duty, or ‘risk management’, s 22 in fact 
defines the word ‘ensure’. He proposes that the effect of the s 22 
definition is to water down the word ‘ensure’ to mean only 
‘reasonable care’, opening the door for PCBU’s to argue that they 
“did their best”.169 Because the primary duty and the officer duty 
are inherently linked, any watering-down of the former has a 
similar effect on the latter. Put another way, if the PCBU’s duty is 
reduced to ‘doing one’s best in health and safety’ then the 
officer’s duty becomes a duty to exercise due diligence (to do 
their best) to see that the PCBU was doing its best. Ultimately, 
Foster warns:170 
 
There is a danger that the word ‘ensure’ will be, in an 
Orwellian transformation, now denuded of meaning and 
comes to mean effectively “we gave it a go so long as it 
was not too expensive” or “it appeared on the agenda”. 
 
Foster concedes that this may overstate the problem, however a 
problem exists nonetheless. Watering down the word ensure has 
a flow on effect throughout the Bill of reducing the level of 
commitment to health and safety required to pass legal muster.  
 
In the art of statutory interpretation, any ambiguities are an 
opportunity to twist the law in your favour.171 The effect of this 
concatenation of ‘reasonable practicabilities’ cannot be known 
                                                
167 Health and Safety Reform Bill, s 17(a)-(e). 
168 While Neil Foster examined the relationship in the Australian context, the 
provisions of the Australian Model Act interrelate in the exact same way as 
the provisions of the New Zealand Bill. See; Model Act 2011, ss 17 
(‘management of risks’), 18 (‘reasonably practicable’), 19 (‘primary duty’), 
and 27 (‘duty of officers’).  
169  Foster Leading the Safety Conversation, above note 144, (no pinpoint 
available). 
170 Ibid. 
171 See generally Quintin Johnstone “An Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory 
Interpretation” (1954) 3 Kansas L Rev 1. 
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until the matter is considered by a court.172 What is certain is 
that at each step in the lengthy chain of provisions there are a 
number of exculpatory factors which officers may rely upon to 
avoid liability,173 especially considering each element must be 
proved by the prosecution to the criminal standard of ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’.174  
 
Because the duty is so intertwined with other provisions in 
the Bill many ambiguities exist that may ultimately limit the 
duty’s potential. Given that the Bill has been based so closely on 
the Model Act of Australia, it is unlikely that substantive 
changes will be made as the Bill passes through the approval 
process. Nevertheless, the uncertainty that persists in the 
meanings and relationships of provisions should at least be 
addressed in an interpretation guide, before cases are tried and 
precedents are set. 
 
VIII Conclusion  
 
The proposed duty of officers has the potential to be uniquely 
helpful in improving New Zealand’s health and safety record. 
The Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment has 
openly stated that a major flaw in New Zealand’s current 
framework is that “it does not explicitly require positive action 
by directors and senior managers of duty holders, [and] 
effectively rewards directors who avoid involvement in matters 
affecting health and safety.”175 The international trend in health 
and safety regulation has been towards placing personal liability 
on high-ranking officers. The proposed duty of officers is New 
Zealand’s first positive step in line with that trend. It is a 
welcome acknowledgement of the gap in the country’s health 
and safety framework, and will go lengths to improving New 
Zealand’s health and safety record. Challenges brought by the 
new world of work, and the inherent clash between OHS 
                                                
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Baiada Poultry Pty Ltd v R (2012) 286 ALR 421; 86 ALJR 459; [2012] 
HCA 14. 
175 Exposure Draft Commentary, above note 25, at [3]. 
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regulation and the corporate world, generate a dire need for a 
new approach to corporate liability. The duty of officers will be 
a transformational measure that will create health and safety 
leaders within every enterprise and will provide effective 
inducement for corporate compliance. Unfortunately, 
ambiguities persist in the duty as drafted, which may limit its 
potential. In order to avoid that result, those ambiguities should 
be addressed in an interpretive guide. 
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